General McChrystal forgot that President Obama doesn’t like to use the word “victory”:
In June, McChrystal noted, he had arrived in Afghanistan and set about fulfilling his assignment. His lean face, hovering on the screen at the end of the table, was replaced by a mission statement on a PowerPoint slide: “Defeat the Taliban. Secure the Population.”
“Is that really what you think your mission is?” one of the participants asked.
In the first place, it was impossible — the Taliban were part of the fabric of the Pashtun belt of southern Afghanistan, culturally if not ideologically supported by a major part of the population. “We don’t need to do that,” Gates said, according to one participant. “That’s an open-ended, forever commitment.”
But that was precisely his mission, McChrystal responded, enshrined in the Strategic Implementation Plan — the execution orders for the March strategy, written by the NSC staff.
“I wouldn’t say there was quite a ‘whoa’ moment,” a senior defense official said of the reaction around the table. “It was just sort of a recognition that, ‘Duh, that’s what in effect the commander understands he’s been told to do.’ Everybody said, ‘He’s right.’”
“It was clear that Stan took a very literal interpretation of the intent” of the NSC document, said Jones, who had signed the orders himself. “I’m not sure that in his position I wouldn’t have done the same thing, as a military commander.” But what he created in his assessment “was obviously something much bigger, and more longer-lasting . . . than we had intended.”
…
On Oct. 9, after awaking to the news that he had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama listened to McChrystal’s presentation. The “mission” slide included the same words: “Defeat the Taliban.” But a red box had been added beside it, saying that the mission was being redefined, Jones said. Another participant recalled that the word “degrade” had been proposed to replace “defeat.”
Already briefed on the previous day’s discussion, the president “looked at it and said, ‘To be fair, this is what we told the commander to do. Now, the question is, have we directed him to do more than what is realistic? Should there be a sharpening . . . a refinement?’ ” one participant recalled.
Degrade the Taliban? Heck, I can do that.
Ahem.
You mangy, scrofulous, hogs—get on your knees and lick my boots! Lick, I said, not kiss!! Let me see tongue. I want these Doc Martens to shine like the full moon. Now, beg my forgiveness. Beg, you worthless cur….
I have some experience, you see, in degradation. I offer my services to my country, especially if I could be joined by Condoleezza Rice in thigh-high patent leather boots.
As the president would say: let me be clear. It is one thing—and a very good thing, too—to change strategy based on the facts on the ground. It is quite another to forgot what the [bleep] they had already told their commander in the field.
Perhaps if the president had met with General McChrystal in the intervening months—McChrystal revealed they hadn’t, remember—he might have recalled such a minor detail. And, who knows, maybe some lives might have been spared?
Way back in the campaign, I erroneously concluded that Obama didn’t want to be president. His bizarre rejection of the flag pin only for a brief period after 9/11—he wore one before and wears one now—among other suicidal stances, opinions, statements, and relationships, were automatic disqualifiers it seemed to me. Maybe even to him, even if we were both wrong.
But I think there’s still something to it. If being president means having to oppose evil, oppose it by means stronger than a speech and a photo op, then he’s not interested.
At least not interested enough to remember how he told the most powerful military force in the history of the planet to conduct itself.
I’m sure it was Bush’s fault.